Oil and shipping
Strait of Hormuz: Oil Flows, Bypass Routes and Risks
The Strait of Hormuz oil chokepoint explained: geography, EIA flow figures, who depends on it, bypass pipelines, Fujairah, and the 2026 disruption to traffic.
The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. The Gulf's largest oil and gas exporters, including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and Iran, ship much of their output through it, and for several of them there is no other sea route. In normal years about a fifth of the world's oil consumption moves through this one channel, and the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) describes it as one of the world's most important oil chokepoints. In 2026 that importance stopped being theoretical.
Geography
The strait runs between Iran to the north and the Musandam peninsula of Oman to the south. According to the International Energy Agency, it is 21 nautical miles (39 km) wide at its narrowest point, and shipping uses two navigable channels, one inbound and one outbound, each 2 miles wide. The strait is deep enough for the largest crude carriers, which is what makes it irreplaceable: there is no alternative sea route out of the Gulf.
How much oil moves through it
The EIA publishes flow estimates as part of its analysis of world oil transit chokepoints. In a June 2025 Today in Energy article, it estimated that oil flows through the strait averaged 20 million barrels per day in 2024, equivalent to about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption and more than a quarter of global seaborne oil trade. Around one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade also passed through the strait in 2024, most of it from Qatar.
The EIA's quarterly estimates show what happened next:
| Quarter | Total oil flows (million b/d) | Crude oil and condensate | Petroleum products | LNG (billion cubic feet per day) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1Q 2025 | 20.9 | 14.8 | 6.2 | 11.7 |
| 2Q 2025 | 21.0 | 14.9 | 6.2 | 11.0 |
| 3Q 2025 | 21.3 | 15.0 | 6.3 | 10.9 |
| 4Q 2025 | 21.6 | 15.9 | 5.7 | 10.5 |
| 1Q 2026 | 14.9 | 10.9 | 4.0 | 7.4 |
| 2Q 2026 | 4.9 | 3.7 | 1.1 | 0.8 |
Source: EIA, Global Energy Security Data, released August 2026. The EIA notes that its 2026 figures are revised frequently and are based on Vortexa tanker-tracking data with additional EIA analysis.
Who depends on it
The exporters are the Gulf producers. The importers are mostly in Asia. In 2024, according to the EIA, 84% of the crude oil and condensate and 83% of the LNG moving through the strait went to Asian markets. China, India, Japan and South Korea together accounted for 69% of all crude oil and condensate flows through the strait. The United States imports comparatively little oil through the strait, but because oil is priced in a global market, a disruption raises prices everywhere.
Bypass pipelines
Only two countries have significant pipeline routes that avoid the strait:
| Pipeline | Route | Capacity |
|---|---|---|
| Saudi East-West pipeline (Petroline) | Eastern Province to Yanbu on the Red Sea | 5 million b/d design capacity |
| Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) | Habshan fields to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman | About 1.8 million b/d |
The EIA estimated in June 2025 that about 2.6 million b/d of unused capacity on these Saudi and UAE pipelines could be available in a disruption. That is a small fraction of normal flows through the strait. The EIA also lists Iran's Goreh-Jask pipeline, with a capacity of about 0.3 million b/d, and a planned UAE pipeline of 1.5 million b/d expected around 2027.
The Red Sea route has its own vulnerability. Oil loaded at Yanbu must leave the Red Sea either to the north, through Egypt's Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline route, or to the south through the Bab el-Mandeb strait. In its September 2026 Short-Term Energy Outlook, the EIA reported that attacks on Saudi oil exports passing through the Bab el-Mandeb had cut exports from Yanbu in August 2026 by about half compared with July, and that Saudi Arabia had increased shipments through the Suez Canal instead. The Bab el-Mandeb watch covers that second chokepoint.
Fujairah and Khor Fakkan
Just outside the strait, on the UAE's Gulf of Oman coast, sit two places that matter for anyone tracking tankers. Fujairah is the end point of the ADCOP pipeline and, according to its port authority, one of the world's three largest bunkering hubs, with large independent storage terminals and a designated anchorage where bunker barges supply ships. Khor Fakkan, a short distance north on the same coast, is a container port whose offshore waters are also used by waiting vessels.
Because these anchorages lie outside the strait, the number of ships waiting there is a useful indicator. It moves with storage economics, bunker demand and any disruption inside the Gulf. A rise can mean congestion, cargoes held in floating storage, or ships waiting for orders. The Strait of Hormuz watch tracks satellite vessel counts at the Fujairah and Khor Fakkan anchorages and in the traffic lanes, refreshed as new imagery arrives.
The 2026 disruption
Conflict in the region disrupted traffic through the strait from late February 2026. The EIA's figures above show total oil flows falling from 20.9 million b/d in the first quarter of 2025 to 14.9 million b/d in the first quarter of 2026 and 4.9 million b/d in the second. Middle Eastern producers shut in production because they could not export it. The EIA reported that Brent crude began the second quarter of 2026 above $100 per barrel, and that on 17 June 2026 the United States and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding that sought, among other things, to resume traffic through the strait.
Traffic did not return to normal. The September 2026 Short-Term Energy Outlook estimated that Middle East crude production shut-ins averaged 6.7 million b/d in August, up from 5.0 million b/d in July, after the renewal of the US blockade on Iran's oil exports following Iranian attacks on tankers in the strait. Brent averaged $91 per barrel in August. The EIA assumed constraints on flows would persist through the fourth quarter of 2026 and that most production and trade would not return to pre-conflict levels until the second quarter of 2027.
The disruption also degraded the data used to monitor it. The EIA noted that since the end of February 2026, AIS signals from ships transiting the strait have been especially unreliable. That is one reason satellite imagery has become a necessary cross-check, as the guide to AIS ship tracking explains.
Key points
- The strait is 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest, with 2-mile inbound and outbound channels, and is the only sea route out of the Gulf.
- EIA estimated flows of 20 million b/d in 2024, about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption; most of it went to Asia.
- Saudi and UAE bypass pipelines had about 2.6 million b/d of spare capacity in the EIA's 2025 estimate, far below normal strait flows.
- EIA data show flows falling to 14.9 million b/d in 1Q 2026 and 4.9 million b/d in 2Q 2026, with constraints expected through the end of 2026.
- Fujairah and Khor Fakkan anchorages, just outside the strait, are a practical place to watch tanker activity.